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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the in MSc in Energy Law, Business, Regulation 
& Policy at the International Hellenic University. In recent times, Mediterranean Sea 
has been at the global spotlight for petroleum exploration and exploitation, mainly due 
to the major discoveries made in the eastern region. Greece, in the years of financial 
crisis, has showed a strong interest to develop its offshore oil and gas sector and major 
developments are projected in the coming future. The offshore activity in Greece, as in 
rest Mediterranean states, is associated with major environmental hazards due to the 
semi-enclosed nature of the sea, the high ecological value and the vulnerability of the 
aquatic ecosystem. Large oil spills may affect numerous coastal states with devastating 
consequences, while operational discharges degrade dangerously an already polluted 
environment. 
 My thesis examines the issue in its legal dimension, viz from the scope of Greek 
applicable regime regulating marine pollution from offshore installations. In the first 
section, the magnitude of the risks is exhibited with the scale of Greek offshore sector 
growth, the pollution that arises from units and the Greek specific concerns. 
Afterword, the research centre’s at the main tools for safety, pollution prevention and 
response under the international law, the European law and Greek domestic law. The 
survey extends to the rules for the responsibility of oil and gas companies in case of 
damage, since a strict liability framework promotes the implementation of 
precautionary measures, while the issue of adequate remediation is also mentioned 
through the financial security provisions. By doing that, the scope is to determine the 
effectiveness of the instruments for Greek seas protection, to underline their gaps and 
limitations. Finally, the major weaknesses of the Greek regulatory system are 
considered, inter alia the insufficient implementation of EU environmental law. The 
concluding chapter makes specific recommendations on essential reforms in 
international legislation and Greek law and policy. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Mediterranean Sea is undoubtedly a unique marine environment. It’s a semi-enclosed 
sea with extreme ecological value, the birthplace of some of the most ancient 
civilizations, a hotspot in global maritime navigation and of course an area of 
continuous geopolitical tensions and war conflicts. Its marine environment faces 
various anthropogenic pressures, such as high maritime traffic, tourism, coastal 
development and irregular fishing. Another serious threat that is posed now comes 
from a dangerously rising human activity, offshore oil and gas drilling. There are more 
than 100 installations operating in the Mediterranean and the recent coastal states’ 
plans cover a remarkably large area of the basin, as depicted in a 2015 map in Annex I 
of this dissertation. The interest at the moment is concentrated in the Levantine Basin 
in eastern Mediterranean, where significant reserves have been spotted, such as the 
gas fields of Zohr in Egypt, the Leviathan and Tamar in Israel and the Aphrodite in 
Cyprus, which are also linked to midstream plans, the East Med pipeline connecting 
Israel, Cyprus and Greece, being an alternative energy corridor for EU gas market. 
Greece, in the years of financial crisis has also intensified its plans for oil and gas 
exploration, within the efforts to attract foreign investments for economic recovery, 
though it has lower oil and gas potentials compared to the Levantine basin littoral 
states. 
 
Oil and gas drilling in Greece just like in rest Mediterranean states raises particular 
considerations. The enclosed nature of the sea, the extremely low level of waters 
renewal and the high proximity between neighboring states indicate that a large oil 
spill would have devastating consequences for numerous coastal states. Also is a highly 
sensitive area, it’s scientifically recognized as one of the 25 top global biodiversity 
hotspots which is being continuously degraded and is dangerously affected climate 
change1. Another particularity that affects the environmental management of offshore 
operations is the jurisdictional challenge. Mediterranean Sea is the sole global example 
                                                 
1 See more in EEA-UNEP/MAP joint report, (2014), Horizon 2020 Mediterranean report. Toward shared 
environmental information systems, EEA Technical report No 6/2014, 
http://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/596, accessed 14 February 2018. 
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where most littoral states haven’t proclaimed their exclusive economic zones (EEZ), 
relying on bilateral delimitation agreements or sui generis rights, due to the bordering 
states disputes and the morphology of the basin as the shore to shore distance is 
nowhere above 400 nautical miles meaning that high seas would be eliminated in case 
of a states’ generic proclamation. Greece due to the conflict with Turkey over Aegean 
Sea zones, has conducted only one delimitation agreement in 1977 with Italy for the 
continental shelf of the two states in the Ionian Sea, while a similar agreement with 
Albania has failed to be completed.  
 
The marine oil spills accidents that occurred in the past, such as the ones in the North 
Sea, the Ixtoc in Mexico and the recent ones of Montara field in 2009 in Australia and 
the Deepwater horizon (DWH) in 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as the legal 
problems that were faced in the aftermath, were a motivation to conduct a research 
on the applicable regime for the protection of Greek marine environment from 
offshore infrastructures. It’s crucial to check whether the occurrence of these events 
has lead to a more comprehensive legal framework. The thesis is also inspired by the 
recent Greek oil spill occurred on September 10, 2017 with oil tanker Agia Zoni II that 
sank in Saronikos Bay, close to the port of Piraeus, releasing approximately 2,500 tons 
of fuel oil and marine gas oil into sea. Within two days after sinking, the oil spill 
reached and contaminated several beaches of the southern Athens suburbs posing a 
serious threat to human, marine life and economy2. The incident was particularly 
discomforting for Greek oil and gas future, as it showed the disproportionately large 
consequences that may have a relatively minor incident and the critical failures of 
Greek mechanism to timely constrain the dispersion of the oil slick occurred only some 
miles from the biggest national port and the central oil spill contingency authority. 
 
It’s true that in offshore industry there is extensive self regulation for environmental 
safety. Internal safety rules and established good oilfield practices have been 
developed over the years out of economic reasons, as is less expensive to prevent the 
                                                 
2 See Smith H.,(2017), ‘Greek oil spill forces closure of Athens beaches’, The Guardian, 14 September 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/14/greek-oil-spill-forces-closure-athens-beaches, 
accessed 10 February 2018.  
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damage than to respond to it, a lesson unambiguously learned after the DWH3. 
However, a lesson that was also tragically learned by this catastrophic event is that 
even a super major oil company in a period of low oil prices, under insufficient 
regulation and relaxed supervision, can show an immense complacency in safety, with 
series of management failures and violations of protective barriers4. So according to 
the above and keeping in mind that Greece is currently at a turning point for its 
offshore exploration, it’s thoroughly needed to examine the applicable framework for 
the protection of the marine environment. Within the scope of this research fall only 
the sea damage attributed to events linked to the operation of the units, either 
accidental (e.g. oil spills) or intentional (e.g. waste discharges). In that sense, the issue 
of units’ decommissioning won’t be examined as well as the external threats, such as 
terrorist attacks, civil protests, or piracy that relate to the protection of the units 
through security regulations5.  
 
With regard to the structure of this thesis, I will firstly discuss the recent resurgence of 
Greek offshore sector, the threats that arise generally and specifically for the Greek 
natural and socio-economic environment. Continuing on, I will centre in the most 
important regulations in the light of the international, European and domestic law with 
the aim to critically assess the effectiveness of the current regime and to underline the 
Greek system limitations. The customary international law and soft law principals 
won’t be elaborated as they are extremely vague and weak in nature and thus 
inappropriate in setting constrains to a highly dangerous activity as the offshore 
                                                 
3 The spill has cost BP a total 62 billion US dollars and eight years after the IOC continues to pay on 
settlements,  Slav I., (2018), ‘BP To Take Final Hit On 2010 Disaster’, Oilprice.com, 16 January, 
 https://oilprice.com/The-Environment/Oil-Spills/BP-To-Take-Final-Hit-On-2010-Disaster.html accessed 
10 February 2018.  
4 The investigation has shown that the company’s actions and state’s regulations were inadequate to 
prevent any accident, see ‘Deep Water. The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling’, Report 
to the President, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011, 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/content-detail.html (accessed 12 February 
2018). 
5 On the issue see Kashubsky, M. (2013) 'Protecting Offshore Oil and Gas Installations: Security 
Threats and Countervailing Measures', Journal of Energy Security, 13 August, 
http://ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=476:protecting-offshore-oil-and-
gas-installations-security-threats-and-countervailing-
measures&catid=140:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=429,  (last visited on 10 February 2018).  
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drilling6. While focusing on the prevention of sea damage this review would be 
incomplete without the inclusion of the liability provisions, including the 
environmental, the civil and criminal liability of the offshore operators in case of 
damage, since when a stringent liability framework is in place, oil companies are urged 
to be more careful during operations and it is assured that responsibility is well 
established in case of damage7. In essence it is attempted to investigate the central 
notions of precautionary principal and polluter pays principal, how are enunciated in 
legal texts and whether are actually satisfied. To this direction and in order to ensure 
that liability rules leads to the proper compensation of the victims, the provisions on 
the financial security instruments used by the oil companies will be also included. 
Finally, the paper draws conclusions, on the future regulatory steps that have to be 
undertaken both beyond and within Greek borders.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 See Gavouneli, M. (1995), Pollution from Offshore Installations, International Environmental Law and 
Policy Series, Graham & Trotman/ Martinus Nijhoff, London, pp. 87-88. 
7There is also the issue of states’ responsibility in a trans-boundary oil spill accident which contributes to 
a stronger environmental protection frame but it won’t be examined in the present paper. 
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1.  Offshore oil and gas installations and the Greek maritime area 
In this chapter is intended to overiew the reasons why a firm and adequate 
environmental regulation applicable to offshore units is absolutely necessary for the 
Greek case. These are the recently fast paced growth of the national pojects, the 
pollution dangers attributed to platforms and the specific hazards arising from Greek 
offshore development.   
 
1.1. The recent developments in Greek offshore oil and gas sector 
 
Greece is not a newcomer in offshore hydrocarbon exploitation activity. It has an 
active offshore production, started from the early 1980’s in the Gulf of Kavala in the 
Northern Aegean.  It is comprised by the Prinos oil field with an ongoing oil production 
at about 3,177 bbls daily (in 2016) and by the South Kavala gas field where gas is 
produced periodically covering only the energy needs of the operator, Energean Oil 
and gas 8.  In recent years, Greece’s attempts for new offshore (as well as onshore) 
exploration and exploitation have been intensified, especially after the creation for 
that purpose of the Hellenic Hydrocarbon Resources Management company (HHRM)9 
in 2011 and the intense interest of major international oil companies. While the 
northern Aegean Sea is a promising area for offshore development, with the Sea of 
Thrace block close to Prinos field having been awarded for exploration to Hellenic 
Petroleum SA (HELPE)10 and Calfrac companies, the attention at the moment is 
concentrated in the offshore blocks in the Ionian Sea and Southern and Western of 
Crete, a maritime area that involves deep water sites ranging from 1.000 up to even 
5.267m. (the deepest point of the Mediterranean sea, in southwestern of Peloponise 
in the Ionian Sea).  
 
In the Ionian Sea, which is regarded “safe haven” as there are no the geopolitical 
tentions found in the Aegean Sea, is the majority of oil blocks. Off the coasts of 
                                                 
8 A Greek oil company with an offshore activity also in other Mediterranean states, in Egypt, Israel and 
Montenegro.More information for the operations of Energean Oil and Gas in the official page: 
https://www.energean.com.  
9 Hellenic Hydrocarbon  Resources Management, http://www.greekhydrocarbons.gr/. 
10 Hellenic Petroleum SA, https://www.helpe.gr/en/. 
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Peloponnese, the West Katakolon field awarded to Energean Oil, with estimated 
recoverable reserve of 10-12 mmbo, is the first at the development stage with oil 
production projected to start in 2019, using drilling from onshore11.Also, the Patraicos 
Gulf field with significant reserves (100 recoverable mmbo) awarded for exploration to 
HELPE and EDISON International where the first exploration well is scheduled to be 
drillied this year. In 2014, an offshore bidding round took place for 20 blocks in the 
Ionian Sea and South of Crete Sea (see the respective map in annex 2) and offers have 
been submitted for three blocks; block 10 in Kyparissiakos Gulf, where HELPE is the 
selected applicant for exploration, with similar estimated reserves to that of Patraikos 
Gulf, block 1 in the north Ionian Sea and block 2 for which a Lease agreement has been 
signed in October 2017 with ΤOTAL(operator)-HELPE-EDISON joint venture12. Following 
an expression of interest by the consortium of Total, ExxonMobil and HELPE for two 
blocks in the west and south west part of the continental shelf of Crete and one by 
Energean Oil and Gas for an Ionian block in the maritime area southern of Kerkyra, 
new international call of tenders has been published on 2 December 2017 in the 
Official Journal of EU13 for exploration and exploitation and will be open for 
applications by interested companies’ until the begging of March 2018. Based on that, 
new blocks will be awarded  the next years and Crete’s maritime area (called as “a high 
risk high reward area”) is projected to enter rigorously in Greek hydrocarbon 
prospection. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 A method already applied by the company to similar projects like Prinos oil field.More data on 
Katakolo operations available at: https://www.energean.com/operations/greece/katakolo/ (last visited 
on 12 February 2018).  
12 See above note 3, exploration section. 
13 Notices 2017/C 411/04 and 2017/C 411/05 from the Government of the Hellenic Republic concerning 
Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and 
using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons,Official Journal of 
the European Union C411,volume 60, 2 December 2017, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2017:411:TOC (accessed 10 February 2018). 
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1.2. Sources of pollution from offshore installations 
 
The offshore operations, although they account only for a negligible share in marine 
pollution in relation to other sources14, are associated with significant threats for the 
marine environment at all stages of development. Firstly, the identification of offshore 
reserves indispensably involves seismic surveys that create intense sound waves that 
fall within the scope of the established definition of marine pollution15 and have a 
harmful effect on the hearing or even the behavior of marine animals (mainly 
cetaceans and sea turtles). It also requires the emplacement of mobile drilling 
platforms and other structures (e.g. pipelines etc.), that entails the disturbance of the 
ecosystem and the emission of pollutants into the sea. When the drilling is on, the 
operational discharges represent a significant source of contaminants entering the sea 
from offshore operations16. These are attributed to the drilling muds (essential for 
drilling and usually water based but in certain cases oil based which are highly toxic17), 
the drilling cuttings (small pieces of crushed rock), the produced water (water that 
comes up with hydrocarbons) containing oil and chemicals, as well as the sewage and 
garbage disposals from the offshore platforms. A disturbing fact is that oil industry may 
be elusive for these pollutants as they’re not easily monitored and to some extent the 
chemical composition of the used fluids may be protected under commercial 
confidentiality.  
 
                                                 
14 Scientific data shows that land based sources are to be blame for the 80% of marine pollution.  
15 Indicatively, marine pollution in UNCLOS, Article 1,para.1(4), is defined as “the introduction by man, 
directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which 
results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards 
to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, 
impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities”. 
16 Tornero V., Hanke G.(2016), Chemical contaminants entering the marine environment from sea-based 
sources: A review with a focus on European seas, Marine Pollution Bulletin 
Volume 112, Issues 1–2, 15 November 2016, Pages 17-38, p.:21. 
17 Estimates has shown that when oil based muds are used, the operational discharges represent the 75-
90% of the oil discharged into sea, see  Anyanova E, (2012),  “Oil Pollution and International Marine 
Environmental Law”, in  Sime Curkovic (ed.) Sustainable Development - Authoritative and Leading Edge 
Content for Environmental Management, InTech Chapter 2 pp. 29-54, p.:52,  
https://www.intechopen.com/books/sustainable-development-authoritative-and-leading-edge-content-
for-environmental-management  (last visited on 10 February 2018). 
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Moreover, the accidental oil spills, caused either by a well blow out (i.e. the loss of well 
control or the well integrity) as occurred in several oil spills incidents18 or a platform 
failure like the Piper alpha disaster (1988) in the British waters of North Sea, remain 
rare but the most devastating events in offshore oil and gas history with usually trans-
boundary implications. A crude oil spill, depending on the type of the extracted oil 
(heavy or light), the size of the spill, the fragility of the marine ecosystem and the 
distance of the rig with the closest shores, it takes a deadly toll primary to sea birds 
and marine mammals that emerge in sea surface to breathe and in lower percentages 
to fish and rest of marine species. It causes a long-term contamination of shorelines19 
and wetlands and a sharp decline in economic productivity. At the same time the use 
of chemical dispersants it may be an additional source of pollutants, because they 
diffuse oil in very small droplets that disperse in the water column and easily enter into 
the food chain and thus although the shores and the coastal wild life are better 
protected, the exposure of marine species to oil increases significantly20. Another 
major danger pose the less known and unreported minor oil spills that may frequently 
occur during operations and can have a serious cumulative impact particularly in the 
Mediterranean Sea where thousands of oil slicks have been detected, as reported by 
the European Parliament Research Service and Joint Research Center, (precisely 9.700 
in 1990-2007). Finally, at the end of their life and in the absence of a proper 
decommissioning process, the numerous fixed rigs may continue to burden the marine 
environment, especially if they are abandoned leading to a slow corrosion and release 
of contaminants or are removed using strong explosives.  
 
 
1.3. Specific concerns over the oil and gas operations in Greek Seas 
 
The creation of a network of oil and gas operations stretching from the Ionian Sea to 
the waters of Southern coasts of Crete is a multiply challenging decision. Most Greek 
                                                 
18 Indicatively it happened in the offshore accidents of Ekofisk Bravo in Norway (1977), Montara H1 well 
in Australia (2009) and DWH in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. (2010).  
19 The extremely lasting effects on sandy coasts were outstandingly verified by a 2007 research study 
that found that 26,000 gallons of oil from the Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989) was still trapped in the sand 
along the Alaska’s shoreline. 
20 See above no.16, p.:19 
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blocks are located in the Hellenic trench area, which is a seismic hotspot globally.  The 
Ionian Sea in particular, is referred as the most seismically active zone of Greece and 
East Mediterranean, as three tectonic plates collide (Apulian, Eurasian and African). 
Estimates21 show that the last decade the Greek oil and gas blocks had the highest 
seismicity of the Mediterranean fields, as dozens of seismic events of magnitude above 
4 has occurred. The seismicity entails an indirect danger for units as it may trigger 
displacement of sediments, seabed fluid leaks or tsunami’s formation22 and should be 
duly assessed before the licensing and the placing of drilling platforms. At the same 
time, it has to be assured that the drilling process won’t activate a seismic activity, a 
consequence that until now is not verified by science or international practice23. 
Additionally, the very maritime area is the habitat of unique, protected and 
endangered marine and coastal species.  The loggerhead sea turtle or Caretta caretta, 
the Mediterranean monk seal or Monachus monachus, numerous birds, cetaceans (e.g. 
sperm whales and dolphins) which are protected inter alia under ACCOBAMS 
(Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and 
contiguous Atlantic area)24 and extended fields of protected Mediterranean seagrass 
species of Posidonia oceanica.  
 
Given that richness in fauna and flora of Greek waters, close or within the hydrocarbon 
blocks are located several Natura 2000 protected sites under the Habitat Directive 
(92/43/EEC for the protection of important marine ecosystems and the wild fauna) and 
flora and the Birds Directive (79/409/EEC as amended by 2009/147/EC over the 
safeguard of breeding or resting sites of migratory or endangered species). Some of 
them are the Zakynthos national marine park in Ionian Sea for the protection of 
                                                 
21 Piante C., Ody D., (2015) Blue Growth in the Mediterranean Sea: the Challenge of Good Environmental 
Status, MedTrends Project, WWF-France, p.42, 
http://medtrends.org/reports/MEDTRENDS_REGIONAL.pdf [accessed 10 February 2018]. 
22See Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in the 
Ionian Sea, June 2016,conducted by the Hellenic Centre of Marine Research (contractor), (in Greek) 
pp.150-152, available at 
http://www.ypeka.gr/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ysAz06DxHEg%3d&tabid=875&language=en-US 
[accessed 10 February 2018]. 
23 The only scientifically ascertained case for a correlation between drilling process and earthquakes and 
in once seismically stable regions, refers to oil and gas procedures that use the hydraulic fracturing 
technique known as “fracking” (e.g. in Oklahoma, Texas, U.S.). 
24Interestingly, ACCOBAMS members have pointed out 8 Greek regions (mostly in the Ionian Sea) that 
require international protection in a total of 15 in the Mediterranean basin.  
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Caretta caretta, the Kyparissiakos Gulf, which is the second most important 
Mediterranean breeding ground of Caretta caretta after Zakynthos and the national 
parks of Ambrakikos Gullf and Messolonghi, Kotychi lagoons in the Patraikos Gulf that 
are also protected under Ramsar Convention for the conservation of important 
wetlands. Offshore oil and gas exploration within these areas is not generally 
prohibited but requires a case by case careful examination for both environmental and 
economic reasons since properly managed Natura sites are associated with significant 
economic benefits and can be the driver for domestic green economy. We should also 
add that under EC pressures, Greece has lately expanded its Natura marine sites with 
50743/2017 Joint Ministerial Decision (JMD) (OGG 4432/Β/15-12-2017)25, adding two 
more sites in the focal areas, Kefalonia Ionian island and the north west coasts of 
Peloponnese and pursuant to EU mandates it’s on the process of constituting a more 
efficient operation and financing scheme of national Natura management agencies.   
 
In strong correlation to the above lies the concern over the serious economic 
repercussions that would cause a marine environmental damage to the prevailing 
sectors of tourism, fishery, aquaculture and maritime navigation. It’s well known that 
at the moment tourism is the building block and the only driving force for the national 
economy. In 2016, according to the data of the World Travel & Tourism Council, it 
contributed the 18,6% of the GDP (32,8 billion EUR) and it offered the 23,4% of 
domestic employment. The Ionian Islands, the Western Greek coasts and Crete 
represent pivotal touristic areas with millions of tourists arriving every year and 
numerous recreational boats and cruise ships mooring at their ports. The damage 
suffered by an oil and gas accident would cripple the Greek economy requiring several 
years to recover and in that sense even out of pure economic reasons is necessary to 
guaranty that offshore exploration and exploitation will be conducted under the 
stricter possible set of rules over safety, oil spill prevention and response. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 The protected marine sites increased considerably, from 6.12% to approximately 22% of its marine 
territory. 
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2.  The pollution from offshore operations under international law 
Given the global dimension of offshore operations, since it involves multinational 
companies with activities around the world and accidents of trans-boundary nature, 
regulation has to be made by international law. In this chapter the main global and 
regional instruments are presented as well as their insufficiency which is finally 
commented.  
 
2.1 The main global international texts 
 
2.1.1 UNCLOS 
 
UNCLOS26 is certainly the fundamental global regulatory tool27 that governs the States 
rights and obligations over the use of the marine environment. The first notable 
provision for Mediterranean Sea protection is found in Articles 122,123 where the 
concept of enclosed and semi-enclosed sea is defined with Mediterranean Basin 
meeting all the required characteristics28 and an obligation being set for neighboring 
States concerted action through inter alia a regional regulation. The areas of exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ)29 and the continental shelf30 are defined, where States are 
granted the sovereign right to exploit natural resources found in the subsea while in 
the territorial sea they enjoy sovereignty. In article 81 is found the only clear mention 
to offshore drilling and the right for setting safety measures, as Coastal State shall have 
the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all 
purposes. As per the marine environmental protection, the convention inspired by the 
principles of Stockholm Declaration 197231, it dedicates part (XII) (art 192-237), the 
                                                 
26 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), adopted 10 December 1982 at 
Montego Bay, 1833 UNTS 3 and entered into force 16 November 1994. 
27 Greece ratified the UNCLOS on 21 July 1995, L. 2321/1995 (Gov. Gazette 136A). 
28 Enclosed or semi-enclosed sea according to Art.122 UNCLOS “means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded 
by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting 
entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States”. 
29 EEZ shall not exceed the 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline (UNCLOS Art.57).  
30  It may stretch up to 350 nautical miles from baseline depending on the geology, overlapping with the 
200 miles EEZ zone (UNCLOS Art. 76).  
31 UNCLOS third conference (1973–1982) initiated its works, a year after United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment in Stockholm (1972) that declared basic principles for the environment and 
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second lengthiest part in the document. It stipulates framework rules that are strictly 
attached to the economic activities permitted in this Treaty32. States are obliged to 
adopt laws for the prevention and control of marine environmental damage33 and to 
promote international assistance both in global and regional level, for the purpose to 
exchange knowledge and to combat pollution. Article 208 speaks for pollution 
prevention from seabed activities, requiring States to have a regime for prevention 
and remediation of pollution not less effective than the international rules (Art.208p.3) 
and recognizes regionalism as the mean for harmonized law creation (Art.208p.4,5). In 
the scope of liability, convention misses to act a concrete legal tool, since in article 
235, while the need for adequate compensation in a pollution incident is confirmed 
the liability regime is to be developed by another legal system. In the sense of the 
above the convention sets only soft law principals34 and the guideline for regulation 
that should be created in the scope of national law and fails to establish specific 
practices that need to be adopted for pollution prevention. Its contribution diminishes 
even more if we consider that there is not an enforcement mechanism for UNCLOS 
environmental provisions. In that sense UNCLOS assist the creation of a possible 
patchwork of domestic law rules and serious contradictions in the regime of Greece 
and rest Mediterranean States, an outcome that goes against the Art.123 requirement 
for a harmonized regime in semi enclosed seas. 
 
 
2.1.2. OPRC 
 
Another important global international tool is the OPRC35, conducted in 1990 under 
the auspices of IMO and in response to the devastating accident of Exxon Valdez in 
                                                                                                                                               
development, such as the 21th principal for State’s obligation to exploit its natural resources without 
causing pollution damage to other States that is a norm of customary Law.   
32 See article 193 UNCLOS where “States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources 
pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the 
marine environment”. 
33 Art.194 UNCLOS. 
34 Esmaeili H., (2001), The Legal Regime of Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law, Aldershot: Ashgate 
Dartmouth, 2001, p.156. 
35 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 1990, adopted 30 
November 1990, ILM 1991, entered into force 12 May 1995. Greece ratified it in 1994 with Law 
2252/94. 
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Alaska in 1989. The aim of this instrument is to establish comprehensive measures for 
an effective response to oil pollution, originated both from ships and offshore oil units. 
Unfortunately, sources of marine pollution other than oil such as accidental or 
deliberate operational discharges of other hazardous mixtures are excluded from the 
scope of the convention leaving outside a very important source of marine pollution. 
To fill this gap, in 2000 an extension to OPRC imperatives was adopted by the States 
members to OPRC for hazardous and noxious waste, (the Protocol on Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation to pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances OPRC/HNS 2000 protocol) setting analogous response commitments but 
are applicable only to vessels source wastes and port facilities (Article 2 (3)). Under 
OPRC the offshore platforms definition is made in an effective, highly inclusive way 
and rules apply to fixed and floating units engaged in different types of operations, 
from exploration, production to loading and unloading of oil36.  Essential actions are 
mandated, such as the obligation of emergency response plans prepared by unit 
operators under Article 3 (2) and approved by the State authority (internal contingency 
plans) and States’ emergency plans under Article 6, (external plans) with a designation 
of competent authority for effective response to oil spills. In Article 4 (c) there is also a 
reporting commitment for the operators of oil platforms for “any event involving a 
discharge or probable discharge of oil or the presence of oil to the competent 
authority”. Particular emphasis is being paid to the creation of a regional response 
mechanism (Article 6 (2)), the need for international cooperation in the event of an oil 
spill (Article 7) and the possible financial (art7(2)) and technical (Art.9) assistance by 
IMO to States actions. This convention is fairly acknowledged as the most efficient37 in 
improving marine environmental safety as it sets out specific obligations and it 
specifies in detail the measures that States and offshore operators has to take to 
respond to oil pollution accidents. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 art.2 (4) 
37 See above note 34, p.158 
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2.1.3. The London Convention 1972 
 
The Convention on the Prevention of Maritime Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter (the London Convention)38 ratified by 87 States to date, is an effort of 
international law to manage and control dumping, meaning the deliberate disposal of 
waste and matter including oil into sea from ships, platforms or other man-made 
structures at sea. It follows the so called “black-and grey-list” approach39 according to 
which, the dumping of Annex I listed wastes is prohibited while the dumping of other 
wastes is allowed upon permission40.  However, as per the offshore activities, the 
applicability of the treaty is limited as the Article III (b) definition of dumping leaves 
outside the disposals during the normal operation of platforms and paragraph c of that 
article underlines that “the disposal of wastes or other matter directly arising from, or 
related to the exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore processing of sea-bed 
mineral resources will not be covered by the provisions of this Convention”. In that 
sense a variety of dangerous pollutants, the drilling wastes, e.g. the cuttings and the 
produced water is deemed to be outside of the scope of the convention.  Also as per 
the civil liability rules though strongly related to the effectiveness of the issued 
prohibitions Article X similarly to UNCLOS provisions impose only the imperative for 
member States to identify the applicable framework for civil liability. In addition to 
that, Greece is not member to the dumping protocol of 1996, a refined legal version 
that superseded London Convention, following a more restrictive approach with a 
“reverse list approach”, where dumping is generally prohibited unless the waste or 
matter are on the approved list of substances and a much broader definition of 
dumping that includes also the deliberate disposal of oil platforms and structures.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 The Convention on the Prevention of Maritime Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
1972, adopted 29 December 1972, 1046 UNTS 120, (entered into force 30 August 1975). 
39 Ibid, art IV (1) where the Annex I blacklist items dumping is prohibited, the Annex II grey-listed 
materials requires a special permit from a designated national authority and all other materials or 
substances can be dumped upon the issuance of a general permit. 
40 Ibid, arts IV(1)(a), IV(1)(b). 
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2.1.4. Other applicable legal instruments 
 
Among other international tools that apply to offshore units and worth noticing, is 
MARPOL 73/7841  that is attributed to the prevention of marine pollution by ships, but 
according to Regulation 39 of Annex I, also applies to fixed and floating platforms 
including drilling rigs, storage and offloading facilities, but only when they are in 
mobile configuration42. Regulation imposes on them under certain exceptions43 the 
same equipment requirements for vessels of 400 gross tones and above, including oil-
water separators, sludge tanks and an oil discharge record and control system 
available in the unit. In essence, MARPOL governs only the discharge of machinery 
space drainage and contaminated seawater introduced into oil tanks (as outlined in 
Appendix 5 of Annex 1 of MARPOL 73/78), leaving outside the most important aspects 
of pollution dangers from offshore rigs that arise during operation such as accidental 
oil spills and drilling wastes that remain to be regulated under national or regional 
tools. The next worth mentioning is the MODU Code44, a soft law instrument drafted 
by IMO, in 1979, and amended in 1989 and 2009, for the construction standards of 
mobile typed platforms45, which is of limited value. Whilst is the only tool that tackles 
the issue of platform design, it’s a non binding document and construction is regulated 
as units being another type of vessel, with no reference to their exploratory 
activities46.  
 
 
                                                 
41 International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships 1973, adopted 2 
November 1973, 1340 UNTS 184, (entered into force 2 October 1983), amended by Protocol of 1978 
Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships 1973, 
adopted 17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61, (entered into force 2 October 1983) (‘MARPOL 73/78’). 
42 Kashubsky, M., (2006), Marine Pollution from the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry; Review of Major 
Conventions and Russian Law (Part 1), Maritime Studies,p.4. 
43 R39 (2), MARPOL 73/78 annex I. 
44 Code of Conduct for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 1989 (1989) 
IMO Assembly Resolution A649(16), came into force 1 May 1991, (MODU Code 1989). 
45 Ibid, Chapter 1.3.1, “Mobile offshore drilling unit" or "unit" is a vessel capable of engaging in drilling 
operations for the exploration for or exploitation of resources beneath the sea-bed such as liquid or 
gaseous hydrocarbons, sulphur or salt”. 
46 See Gavouneli M., (2013) “Offshore Installations: A Comprehensive Regime?” MEPIELAN e-bulletin, 04 
April 2013, p.4,  available at http://www.mepielan-
ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&CategoryId=4&ArticleId=137&Article=Offshore-Installations-A-
Compehensive-Regime, (accessed on 10 February 2018). 
  -16- 
2.2. The regional legal tools 
 
 2.2.1 The Barcelona Convention 
  
In 1975, Mediterranean Sea became the first region ever addressed by UNEP Regional 
Seas Program initiative with the adoption of the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) for 
the protection of the marine environment. A year later, the Barcelona Convention,47 a 
regional convention supplemented by specific protocols, was concluded for seventeen 
contracting members (including the European Community), being the legal instrument 
of Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) that entered into force in 1978. In realization that 
regional tools can be more successful in tackling the special needs and problems of 
each marine ecosystem and easier in the adoption by the interested States, since they 
cede sovereignty to a regional instead of a global institution48, Barcelona Convention 
was the first framework convention that provided for generic rules on States actions 
against different sources of pollution and environmental challenges. In 1995, a 
modification to the Convention was adopted within the MAP Phase II (that renamed 
the Convention to “Convention for the Protection of Marine Environment and the 
Coastal Region of the Mediterranean”49), which came into force in 2004 for 22 
Contracting parties including the European Union50.  The revised Barcelona Convention 
as it applies now, calls States “to prevent, abate, combat and to the fullest possible 
extent eliminate pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area” (Article 4 (1)), to apply the 
precautionary approach and polluters pay principal, to undertake environmental 
impact assessment, to cooperate with Contracting States in pollution mitigation and to 
promote integrated coastal zone management (Article 4 (3)). 
 
                                                 
47 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, adopted on 16 February 
1976 and entered into force on 12 February 1978. 
48 Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (1995), Regionalism in World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.: 
312-313. See also UNCLOS Art. art.208 para.4,5. 
49 Convention for the Protection of Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean 
adopted on 10 June 1995 and entered into force on 9 July 2004. 
50 The 21 Contracting States are Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, 
Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, 
Tunisia and Turkey. 
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As an umbrella convention and at the same logic of UNCLOS, it codifies only generic 
rules that States needs to translate into specific national laws measures. It requires 
State actions against various forms of marine pollution, and specifically, for seabed 
activities, Article 7 states that “Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures 
to prevent, abate and to the fullest extent possible eliminate pollution from the 
Mediterranean Sea resulting from exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf 
and the seabed and its subsoil”. The issue of civil liability is treated the same way, 
conferring States the obligation to adopt effective civil liability and compensation rules 
(Article 16). Given that the Convention provides only the guideline for Mediterranean 
Sea protection, seven specific Protocols were adopted to address each of the 
environmental issues indentified in its articles. These are: the Dumping Protocol from 
ships and aircraft, the Prevention and Emergency Protocol51, the Land-based Sources 
and Activities Protocol, the Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity 
Protocol52, the Offshore Protocol (pollution from exploration and exploitation)53, the 
Hazardous Wastes Protocol and the Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
(ICZM)54.  
 
Among them, the Offshore Protocol having its legal basis on Article 7 of Barcelona 
Convention, It articulates specific and technical rules that govern the whole cycle of 
offshore operations, starting from the authorization process and the units 
establishment to the safety measures and monitoring during operation and the final 
step of structures removal. Until now, the Offshore Protocol along with its sister 
Protocol adopted in 1989 within the framework of the 1978 Kuwait Regional 
Convention, is the only comprehensive international text dedicated to the pollution 
arising from seabed activities. Interestingly enough, given its adoption date (1994), it 
remains a very forward thinking technical document and the high number of its 
                                                 
51 The Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution from Ships and, in Cases of Emergency, 
Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea adopted in 2002 and entered into force on 17 March 
2004 replacing its old version. 
52 The Protocol concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean 
adopted on 10 June 1995 and entered into force on 12 December 1999. 
53The Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration 
and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil was adopted on 14 October 
1994 and entered into force on 24 March 2011.  
54 The Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean was adopted on 21 
January 2008 and entered into force on 24 March 2011. 
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requirements55 is the reason why remained inactive for more than fifteen years until 
to its entry into force in 2011 as well as the low number of ratifications. Only six States 
are bound by its requirements56 (plus the European Union) and Greece hasn’t ratified 
it yet. Cyprus is the only EU State that chose to apply its provisions. However, since to 
EU accession to the Protocol in 2013, it became binding for Greece and thus its 
contribution will be examined in the section 3.2. of this dissertation. For the same 
reasons and in the same chapter will be discussed two more protocols that influence 
the regulation of offshore development, the 1995 SPA and Biological Diversity Protocol 
and the 2008 Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM).  
 
It’s worth noticing that Greece has followed a weak incorporation of the Barcelona 
rules, since the Protocols that has acceded to and have an impact on offshore drilling 
regulation are: the initial 1976 version of the Dumping Protocol that applies an 
outmoded treatment of discharges based on lists57, the Emergency Protocol that 
caters for States emergency cooperation in a event of an oil spill with the assistance of 
Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea 
(REMPEC)58, an important organization established mainly for this aim and the 
outdated 1982 SPA Protocol that doesn’t entail the problem of marine biodiversity.  
 
Another aspect that needs to be put under consideration is the Barcelona’s System 
weak effectiveness59, as both the Convention and the Protocols are characterised by a 
lack of enforcement mechanism and so poor implementation by contracting states. 
Indeed, the only means of compliance are a reporting commitment for Contracting 
States (Article 26, Barcelona Convention) and a compliance monitoring on behalf of 
Parties Conferences (Article 27, Barcelona Convention). Without the imposition of 
                                                 
55 For the contribution of Protocol’s provisions see Raftopoulos E. (2010), Sustainable Governance of 
Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the Mediterranean: Revitalising the Dormant Mediterranean 
Offshore Protocol, MEPIELAN Center, Greece, 
eBulletin,http://www.mepielanebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&CategoryId=4&ArticleId=29&Article=S
ustainable-Governance (accessed 12 February 2018).  
56 The 6 countries that have ratified the Protocol are: Albania, Cyprus, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria and Libya. 
57 Similar to that of the above mentioned Dumping Convention 1972. 
58 See about REMPEC’s role in http://rempec.org/rempec.asp?pgeVisit=New&theID=6. 
59 For a discussion on MAP effectiveness and the methodology used for measurement, see Frantzi, 
Sofia (2007) Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: a case study of the Mediterranean 
Action Plan, PhD thesis, University of York. 
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sanctions, it lies with States political will to actually implement the respective 
provisions. Another disappointing fact is that civil liability, although an inherent part 
for the success of the Mediterranean regime it remains unregulated. The only 
attempts to govern this notion were in 1997 UNEP-MAP Secretariat draft text60 
proposing strict liability for environmental damage and the creation of a 
Mediterranean Inter-State Compensation Fund (for financial assistance in the event 
that an operator couldn’t meet the costs) and in 2008 with Mediterranean Guidelines61 
a soft law document that pose only proposals for further actions that need to be 
taken62.  
 
 
2.3. The inadequacy of international law  
 
The survey of the applicable international law that regulates the offshore activities is 
clear the leads to disappointing conclusions. There isn’t any international text in place 
for Greece to govern all aspects of offshore oil and gas drilling. From both global and 
regional point of view the instruments for safety and pollution prevention give rise to 
either, generic and soft law principals for States action, (e.g. UNCLOS and Barcelona 
Convention) or rules that apply only to certain aspects of offshore drilling industry (i.e. 
MARPOL for discharges during transit and London Convention for few deliberate 
discharges) and both show poor enforceability. Although there have been series of 
evolution in offshore drilling activities, the legal regime still remains undeveloped and 
highly fragmented in nature. Authors suggest several reasons for this lacuna63; the 
relatively recent scale up of offshore development, the low share in marine pollution in 
relation to other activities (i.e. land based industries), the occurrence of few major 
                                                 
60 United Nations Environment Programme ‘Appropriate Procedure for the Determination of Liability 
and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Pollution of the Marine Environment in the 
Mediterranean Sea Area’ (1997) Doc. UNEP (OCA)/MED WG. 117/3 of 1 July 1997 (‘The 1997 draft’). 
61 Guidelines for the Determination of Liability and Compensation for Damage resulting from Pollution of 
the Marine Environment in the Mediterranean Sea Area, hereinafter “Guidelines” Doc. UNEP(DEPI)/MED. 
IG.17/10 of 18 January 2008. 
62 See for further discussion in Scovazzi T. (2009) The Mediterranean Guidelines for the Determination of 
the Environmental Liability and Compensation: The Negotiations for the Instrument and the Question of 
Damage that Can Be Compensated, in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 13, 2009, p 
183-212. 
63 See notably Gavouneli and Kashubsky, above notes 6 and 42.   
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accidents worldwide, the strong opposition of oil companies, the fact that platforms 
are usually out of sight leading to the underestimation of their dangers and of course 
the significant unwillingness of States to hurdle a high state revenue producing 
industry. Irrespectively of the reasons of this imbalance, the consequences for a State 
like Greece, that lacks experience and a sophisticated national law already established 
in other States (e.g. Norway) are huge, since there is no a universal model to adhere to 
or to use as a benchmark.  Within the limits of EU Law, Greece has a wider margin of 
discretion in drafting safety and liability rules in national Law or in bilateral agreements 
and during its serious economic woes may tend to lessen its environmental regime in 
order to attract more offshore investments comparing to other Mediterranean 
countries64.Also oil companies have dangerously more room for setting their own 
safety and response principals65.  
 
The absence of international instrument in the area of civil liability and compensation 
is particularly discomforting, given that an oil spill in Greece will possibly have trans-
boundary effects involving both EU and third countries. With regard to the legal basis 
for third states to raise a claim for operators’ responsibility and compensation, no 
bilateral agreement has been signed between Greece and a third State and the 
application of private international law, civil liability and compensation claim rules of 
domestic law cannot appropriately handle the issue. While in vessel sourced pollution 
a comprehensive and international system has for long been in place and adopted by 
Greece, the Civil Liability Compensation Convention (CLC) 196966 and the 1971 Fund 
Convention as both amended in 1992, setting strict liability67 on ship owners in case of 
                                                 
64 Gavouneli M. above note 6 p.118, where is underlined the inherent danger for softer liability 
provisions in a period of economic hurdles. 
65 For some reflections on the dangers of the increased role of privates see Trevisanut, S. (2015). Is 
There Something Wrong with the Increasing Role of Private Actors? The Case of the Offshore Energy 
Sector in Cedric Ryngaert, Erik J. Molenaar & Sarah M.H. Nouwen (Eds.),What's Wrong with 
International Law? Liber Amicorum A.H.A. Soons (63p.). Martinus Nijhoff 
https://books.google.gr/books?id=VxJ5CgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=What%27s+Wrong+with+In
ternational+Law?&hl=el&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjE9dH2hJHYAhUQ_aQKHYWPBM0Q6AEIJzAA#v=onepage
&q=What's%20Wrong%20with%20International%20Law%3F&f=false, (accessed 12 February 2018). 
66 The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) entered into force on 19 
June 1975 and was replaced by 1992 Protocol that came into force on 30 May 1996. 
67 Meaning the establishment of liability based on the causal link between the incident and the damage, 
without the need of fault or negligence on part of the operator. 
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an oil spill  and  covering high limit compensations68 not paid by the ship-owner, in 
offshore drilling and even after the recent devastating accidents, (e.g. Montara and 
DWH oil spills), the liability is an issue that traditionally evade international 
governance. This is verified by the striking failure of a civil liability convention for the 
civil liability for oil damage from offshore exploration and exploitation activities 
(hereinafter ‘CLEE’) 69 that was drafted in 1977 at the same pattern of CLC provisions, 
setting strict liability of operators of a wide network of offshore installations as well as 
a mandate for adequate compensation in case of damage and a limit on the amount of 
damage that could be claimed against operators. It was the only global tool ever 
designed for offshore oil and gas activities that it didn’t eventually come into force, as 
only six States became signatories with no accessions70. Adding to that the IMO’s 
stable refusal to include a liability treaty within its agenda71 and the weak efforts taken 
by the Barcelona Members in the issue it becomes evident that international 
community hasn’t learned its lessons from the past oil disasters.Remarkably, the only 
regulation in force is attributed to an industry’s private initiative, the Offshore 
Pollution Liability Agreement (`OPOL')72, which however applies only in oil spills from 
operations in the maritime areas of North and West Europe73 and according to which 
OPOL parties mutual guarantee to compensate the victims if a member should default. 
So, in the view of the above, another issue that has to be checked in the next chapters 
is whether oil companies operating in the Greek oil fields and especially the small ones, 
                                                 
68 The maximum compensation payable by the 1992 Fund is 203 million SDR, while the Supplementary 
Fund Protocol, adopted in 2003 in response to the Prestige accident (2002) sets the top limit of 750 
million SDR per incident http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/legal-framework/1992-fund-convention-
and-supplementary-fund-protocol/ (accessed 12 February 2018). 
69 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation 
of Seabed Mineral Resources, 1 May 1977, 16 ILM 1451 (‘CLEE’). 
70 CLEE, art. 20 requires no less than four states to ratify the convention in order to come into force. 
71 IMO while being the only organization that can handle the issue properly and has already step in the 
offshore activities regulation with MODUs Code, in 2013 following a request of the Indonesian 
delegation, concluded that that there was no need for an international agreement, but only for IMO 
assistance to States legislative actions. For the different views expressed over the issue see R. Shaw 
(2011), “Trans-boundary Oil Pollution Damage Arising from Exploration and Exploitation of Offshore Oil. 
Do We Need An International Compensation Convention?” CMI News letter, pp. 18-23, available at: 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Newsletters/CMI%20News%202011-3.pdf, (accessed 13 
February 2018). 
72 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (`OPOL') came into effect 1 May 1975, amended 1 August 1986 
available at http://www.opol.org.uk/. It covers damages up to a maximum of US $250,000,000 per 
incident.  
73 OPOL clause 1 (8) excludes application to offshore facilities operating in the Baltic or the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
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in the absence of an agreement like ‘OPOL’ or a Compensation Fund (of global or 
Mediterranean range) will be able to absorb the damages of a large oil spill through 
effective financial security arrangements. 
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3. The main aspects of European regulatory regime 
EU law is the main source of the Greek environmental legislation. In the area of 
offshore drilling, the applicable rules aim to supplement the deficit noted in 
international law.  This scope is mainly materialized by a sector specific directive 
(2013/30/EU) and the incorporation of the Offshore Protocol of the Barcelona 
Convention. 
  
 3.2. The role of the offshore safety Directive (2013/30/EU)  
 
EU is traditionally known for the pivotal attention that pays in environmental issues 
and for the adoption of high environmental standards. However, in the scope of 
offshore drilling, EU has showed a surprisingly late regulatory response. Based on EU’s 
shared competence with Member States on the environmental issues and following 
the rules of subsidiarity and proportionality of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
EU74, the 2013/3 EU Directive (hereinafter Offshore Safety Directive, OSD), is the first 
legal tool that EU has ever created specifically for the safety and regulation of offshore 
activities. In the light of DWH accident that fired serious international concern from 
countries and NGOs, over the way oil companies conduct their business and the 
sufficiency of the applicable regime, the European Commission (EC), realizing the gaps 
and the fragmented nature of EU regulatory regime, it published a Communication75 in 
2010, where it pinpointed the improvements and the actions that need to be 
considered and a year latter submitted a proposal76 for a Regulation on the matter of 
EU offshore safety. Unfortunately the reactions posed by some States and the oil 
industry77 led unsatisfactory to the adoption of a Directive which is a less stringent tool 
as it grants legal flexibility in Member States. The new tool on safety of offshore oil and 
                                                 
74 Articles 191,192,193 of TFEU are applicable for environmental protection. They need to be read in 
combination with Article 194 para.2 of TFEU which upholds that Member States have the right to 
determine the conditions for the exploitation of their natural resources but within the limits of EU 
environmental protection measures. 
75 Communication from the Commission "Facing the challenge of offshore oil and gas activities", 
COM(2010) 560 final of 12.10.2010. 
76 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on safety of offshore oil and 
gas prospection, exploration and production activities', SEC(2011) 1293 final. 
77 Fiona Harvey,( 2011),  ‘Plans for tough European rules on oil spills come under attack’, The Guardian, 
19 April,  available at  https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/19/european-oil-spill-
rules-under-attack,  accessed 14 February 2018. 
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gas operations, published in 12 June 2012, with a transposition deadline until 19 July 
2015 and it’s in essence an attempt to harmonize and ameliorate the existing EU 
instruments78. These instruments are mainly: the Directives 2001/42/EC and 
85/337/EEC (as amended) for the requirement for the offshore projects of a strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) and an environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
respectively; the Hydrocarbons Directive 1994/22/EC on the conditions for granting 
authorization which mostly refers to EU competition rules; the Environmental Liability 
Directive 2004/35/EC that apply the polluters pay principal for environmental damage 
and sets strict liability for operators; the Council Directive 1992/91/EEC for the safety 
and health protection  of workers in offshore drilling activities and the Waste 
Framework Directive 2008/98/EC on the responsibility for the proper management of 
produced wastes which covers the case of marine oil spills as is hold by the ECJ79. 
 
Although known as the safety Directive, it does not aim to generally safer and more 
sustainable offshore operations. It’s dedicated only to major accident prevention and 
this aim is satisfied by some minimum protective mandates80. National licensing 
authorities are obliged to perform a due diligence assessment of the technical and 
financial capabilities of the applicant81, extending the conditions for granting 
authorization under 1994/22/EC Directive and giving emphasis to the potential 
damage of highly sensitive ecosystems82 and the acceptance of alternative financial 
security arrangements to facilitate coverage (e.g. bonds, guarantees, insurance pools 
etc.) There is a commitment for an effective public participation and access to 
                                                 
78Gavouneli, M. (2013), Offshore Installations: A Comprehensive Regime?, MEPIELAN e-bulletin, p.3. 
79See Case C-188/07 , Commune de Mesquer v Total France SA and Total International Ltd, Judgment of 
24 June 2008,European court of Justice (case on Erika accident) available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A62007CJ0188, (accessed 14 February 2018) affirmed 
that “Hydrocarbons accidentally spilled at sea following a shipwreck, mixed with water and sediment 
and drifting along the coast of a Member State until being washed up on that coast, constitute waste 
within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442, as amended by Decision 96/350, where they are 
no longer capable of being exploited or marketed without prior processing.” The Water Framework 
Directive repealed Directive 2006/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 
on waste (the codified version of Directive 75/442/EEC as amended). 
80 In respect of the limited scope of the directive in relation to the proposed regulation see  L. SCHIANO 
DI PEPE, Offshore oil and gas operations in the Mediterranean Sea: regulatory gaps, recent 
developments and future perspectives, in J. JUSTE RUIZ, V. BOU FRANCH (ed.), Derecho del Mar y 
Sostenibilidad ambiental en el Mediterráneo, Valencia, 2014, 378-387, p.381 [e-mail]. 
81 Article 4, OSD. 
82 Article 4(6) OSD. 
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information for the planned project83 which is pursuant to the rules set by Aarhus 
Convention84 which links human rights and environmental protection. But most 
importantly, at the heart of the regime lies the operator’s commitments to prepare a 
major hazards report85 and an internal contingency plan86 prior the commencement of 
operations, to adopt of an effective day to day accident prevention policy87 and to 
provide information of the well operation and design88. The compliance of the 
operators with these requirements is supervised by an independent competent 
authority which is in charge of the assessment of operators’ submitted documents and 
the overall implementation of safety rules using inspections and enforcement 
measures. In fact the competent authority is the cornerstone for their implementation, 
acting under the assistance and guidance of the European Union Offshore Oil and Gas 
Authorities Group (EUOAG)89. Continuing on, another important contribution is that 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) emergency response competencies are 
extended to oil and gas oil spills90, and less experienced states like Greece may be 
aided by its technological and scientific assistance. This is a significant aid especially if 
we notice that in September 2017 the emergency response vessel of EMSA Aktea 
OSRV, operating in the Aegean Sea assisted within few hours the Greek authorities in 
the recovery of the leaking oil out of the wreck of Agia Zoni II oil tanker91. Also a sheer 
reference to Mediterranean Sea is found in Article 33, with a mandate for coordination 
of preventative and response actions of member states and third countries.  
 
On the issue of liability, OSD, as all the tools reviewed so far, fails to constitute a 
comprehensive regime, as Article 7 merely channels civil liability to licensees, leaving 
Member States to define its nature (strict or fault based) and its range (limited or not), 
                                                 
83 Article 5 OSD. 
84 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998. 
85 Articles 12,13 OSD. 
86 Article 14 OSD. 
87 Article 19 OSD. 
88 Article 15 OSD where is found the only imperative related to the construction of units after the 
adoption of MODU IMO Code. 
89 More about EUOGAS role in https://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
90 Article 10 OSD. 
91 EMSA press release on 13 Sept. 2017, available at 
file:///C:/Users/Admin/Downloads/PRESS%20RELEASE_OSRV%20AKTEA_Mobilisation%20(1).pdf 
[accessed 14 February 2018]. 
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while Article 38 extends the application of 2004/35/EC Directive for environmental 
liability92 to cover damages caused in the areas of EEZ and Continental Shelf of the 
Coastal States. However, although the issue of civil liability and compensation remains 
in national hands, Article 39 orders a review by EC of the effectiveness of national law 
provisions and the availability of efficient financial instruments with the view to 
broaden EU corresponding provisions. It also looks at the potential of bringing oil and 
gas platform accidents under the scope of criminal Law under the Environmental 
Crime Directive 2008/99/EC since this is within the competencies of EU if it’s deemed 
necessary for the EU environmental protection policy implementation93. The first EC 
report pursuant to Article 39 was published on 14 September 2015 and highlighted the 
limited availability of alternative financial instruments, with Greece (and most Member 
States) accepting only insurance as well as the heterogeneity in domestic civil liability 
rules but it concluded that is too early to introduce any changes94. 
 
The survey of new Directive provisions indicates that is surely a step further and the 
basis for the safer conduct of the increasing oil and gas operation in the Greek Seas. 
Notwithstanding, this case lies in the effective incorporation into national law and 
implementation. Greece has recently transposed the OSD into national law, on 28 July 
2016 with L.4409/201695 more than year after the given deadline and after an 
infringement procedure initiated by the European Commission (25 February 2016)96.A 
problematic point of L.4409/2016 is that the role of the competent authority is 
conferred to the HHRM company, a société anonyme which operates under private 
law and under the supervision of State, that is its sole shareholder97. As stated in art.8 
(4) L.4409/2016 and in tandem with Article 8(3) OSD, until the creation of a district 
legal person and provided that the number of offshore operations is below six, the 
duties of the Greek competent authority are entrusted to HHRM although its main 
                                                 
92 Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004. 
93 We should note that by contrast this necessity has declared in vessel source oil spills as they are 
already included in the list of EU environmental crimes. 
94 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on liability, 
compensation and financial security for offshore oil and gas operations pursuant to Article 39 of 
Directive 2013/30/EU COM(2015)422 and COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT that 
accompanied the report, SWD/2015/0167 final. 
95 OGG 136/A/2016. 
96 Formal requests were also addressed against Portugal and Netherlands. 
97 See Art.145-154 L.4001/2011 for the establishment of the HHRM. 
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purpose is the economic development and the management on behalf of the State of 
the Greek oil and gas fields98. However, besides this OSD granted exception, the duties 
of safety and environmental protection shall be fulfilled by the company in a 
independent and objective way in relation to its economic development targets99. This 
requirement is not satisfied in HHRM. Article 36 (1) L.4409/2016 (that amended 
art.147, 2 (c) of L.4001/2011), stresses that sources of HHRM income are all the 
revenues for oil and gas concessions, i.e. royalties, surface fees, signature and 
production bonus and although this is an accepted source of finance under OSD100, the 
company show high dependence to them as these resources truly guarantee its 
operation and liquidity101. Also on these resources is depended the functionality and 
the proper staffing of the company with additional employees empowered with the 
new responsibilities. In that sense the Greek offshore development is at HHRM 
company’s best economic interest and thus in HHRM duties there is a clear 
contradiction which is against the scope of OSD (Art.8 (2) OSD)102. It’s revealing to note 
that this was exactly a problem realized by the US authorities in the aftermath of 
Deepwater Horizon when the supervisory duties were removed from the Minerals 
Management Service, an agency mostly interested in generating and collecting lease 
revenues rather than securing environmental safety103. This is a problem of paramount 
importance for the lawful implementation of OSD rules and needs to be tackled 
promptly with the creation of a distinct, truly impartial authority by Greek State and 
                                                 
98 Ibid. 
99 See Recital 21 and Art. 8 para 2 of OSD. 
100 Art.8,(7) OSD. 
101 The total revenues of 2016 were 624.911€, out of which 298.466€  derived from royalties and  
4.127€ from surface fees.Annual Economic report of HHRM of 2016, (in Greek) available at: 
file:///C:/Users/Admin/Downloads/etisia-oikonomiki-ekthesi-deuteris-oikonomikis-hrisisZ1.1.2016-
31.12.2016.pdf [accessed 14 February 2018]. 
102 Is important to note that art.8 (2) L.4409/2016 mentions only the general obligation for 
independence and objectivity of the first sentence of the corresponding Art.8(2) OSD while the latter 
continues on clarifying that “conflicts of interest shall be prevented between, on the one hand, the 
regulatory functions of the competent authority and, on the other hand, the regulatory functions relating 
to the economic development of the offshore natural resources and licensing of offshore oil and gas 
operations within the Member State and the collection and management of revenues from those 
operations”. So the Greece choice of HHRM is deemed to be against the meaning and the scope of this 
article. 
103 See ‘Deep Water. The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling’, Report to the President, 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011 pp.254-260, 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/content-detail.html (accessed 12 February 
2018). 
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essentially by EC intervention for an incorrect transposition and even the 
establishment of an EU agency to oversee domestic authorities’ efficient operation. 
 
 
3.2. EU and Mediterranean regime integration 
 
In the aftermath of the DWH accident EU also turned its focus on the Mediterranean 
Sea and the dangers that arise from the increasing number of oil and gas operations, 
proposing the accession of the European Union to the Barcelona’s Offshore Protocol 
provisions104. The EU historically has been a strong partner in Mediterranean legal 
system having acceded to almost all of its Protocols, but for the Offshore Protocol at 
the time of its adoption in 1994, Community didn’t sign it preferring the establishment 
of a European tool. It was in 2011 when the Protocol was realized to be essential to 
increase safety of oil and gas activities in the Mediterranean and the final Council 
Decision was adopted on 17 December 2012105. The effect of this action is that now 
the Offshore Protocol has entered into the EU legal framework under Article 216 of 
TFEU106 as second level legislation instrument, ranked below the Treaties but above 
Directives. That’s of great significance for Greece, since, although it hasn’t ratified the 
Protocol, its provisions have a direct effect into national law order, so is obliged to 
apply it and to participate to the Offshore Contracting Parties discussions and actions 
for the promotion of its implementation such as the recently adopted Offshore Action 
                                                 
104 Proposal for a Council Decision on the accession of the European Union to the Protocol for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the 
continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil, COM(2011) 690 final, 2011/0304 (NLE), Brussels 27 
October 2011. 
105 Council Decision of 17 December 2012 on the accession of the European Union to the Protocol for 
the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of 
the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil, (2013/5/EU), Official Journal of the European 
Union, 9 January 2013, L 4/13, par. 4; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. 
do?uri=OJ:L:2013:004:0013:0014:EN:PDF (accessed 12 February 2018). 
106 Article 216 of TFEU: “1. The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or 
international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is 
necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred 
to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or 
alter their scope. 2. Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union 
and on its Member States”; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version), 
Official Journal of the European Union, 9 May 2008, C 115/47, C 115/199. 
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Plan (2016-2024)107, that inter alia urges for the ratification of the Protocol by all 
Parties and most importantly calls for financial and technical  assistance to States to 
achieve regional safety. Also, since the Protocol is part of EU Legal framework, its 
embodiment to Greek legal system falls within the competencies of EC and the 
European Court of Justice with the availability of implementation and compliance 
control means used for EU environmental Law108.  
 
A question however that needs to be answered is whether the Offshore Protocol from 
its incorporation into EU law, besides facilitating the uniform regulation for 
Mediterranean offshore development, it actually establishes new rules other than that 
of the OSD for Greece and rest EU Mediterranean States. It’s true that the two 
instruments share many common provisions, since EU has adopted to a great extend 
the Protocol’s rules, (e.g. the prior authorisation environmental, technical and financial 
evaluation, the contingency planning and the creation of a competent authority), but 
there are some important differences. A comparative analysis of the two instruments 
show that the Protocol has a more refined definition of “operator” as its rules apply 
also to the person that is de facto in control of the unit, while the Directive refers only 
to the authorised operators. Also, the section III of the Protocol sets detailed rules for 
the proper management of wastes, i.e. harmful and noxious substances drilling cuts, 
sewage and garbage that should be read in parallel with the applicable European 
legislation, the Waste Framework Directive. As per the liability issue, the rules 
unfortunately are similar to that of OSD Directive, as in Article 27 of the protocol notes 
that until States develop their own liability rules, liability for damages shall be linked to 
operators and they should use adequate financial security tools, without though 
clarifying the types of the damages that shall be covered109. Besides the focal 
differences the two instruments, the most important aspects of EU and Barcelona 
                                                 
107 Decision IG.22/3 - Mediterranean Offshore Action Plan in the framework of the Protocol for 
the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of 
the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, adopted on 12 February 2016. 
108 Some of the characteristic EU tools for implementation are: reports and inspections for monitoring , 
claimants and petitions for EU Law violations, the cutting of EU financial assistance and the infringement 
procedures, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/compliance.htm [last visited on 12 February 2018]. 
109 Article 27 uses only the word “damages”, missing to clarify the type of damages (ecological or 
financial) covered by the liability provision. 
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Protocol convergence is the creation of synergies between EU and Barcelona regional 
institutions in the area of Mediterranean marine protection, with EMSA and REMPEC 
possibly join their forces for oil spill prevention and response.  
 
Obviously, the two legal documents are the main elements of Greek legal toolbox. 
More importantly, their provisions should be implemented in accordance to the 
objectives set in Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008/56/EC) based on which 
Greece has to take measures for the “Good Environmental Status” (GES) of its seas by 
2020. Also, the sustainable use of Greek marine spaces is further reinforced by the 
incorporation into EU acquis of two more Barcelona Protocols that confine offshore 
fossil fuel plans and Greece has also missed to ratify: the SPAs and Biological Diversity 
Protocol and the ICZM Protocol. The SPAs and Biological Diversity Protocol, ratified by 
EU in 1999110, sets the mandate to protect biodiversity and endangered species 
through the establishment of Specially Protected Areas of Mediterranean Importance 
(SPAMI) and correlates with the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted by Greece 
in 1994111, as being essential tools for the conservation of Greek Seas which are 
biodiversity hot spots and the habitat of several endangered and rare species. 
Naturally, according to Article 21 of the Offshore Protocol in these zones the offshore 
activities are allowed only under specific constrains. Nevertheless, Greece until now 
has missed to create any SPAMI within its waters. On the other hand, the 2008 
Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM)112 is the seventh protocol 
and entered into force the same date with the Offshore Protocol (on 24 March 2011) 
and its scope is the preservation and the sustainable use of coastal zone which extend 
from the external limit of the territorial sea to landward limit of the coastal zone (as 
defined by each State)113. Based on its text, Greece needs to follow an integrated 
approach taking into consideration the protection of both the aquatic environment 
                                                 
110 Council Decision 1999/800/EC allowed the Community to accede to the revised SPAS and Biological 
Diversity Protocol. 
111 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro on 5 June 1992 and entered into force on 29 December 1993. Greece’s currently implements the 
first biodiversity protection strategy (2014-2029) under the Convention aiming inter alia to fill the gap of 
poor scientific knowledge over the issue in the Greek Seas. 
112 Council Decision 2010/631/EU of 13 September 2010 allowed EU to adopt the ICZM Protocol that 
entered into force on 24 March 2011. 
113 Article 3, paragraph 1(a),(b) ICZM Protocol. 
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and the human activities (fishing, tourism etc.) and to ensure the least possible impact 
to coastal ecosystem at the stage of authorisation of offshore drilling activities114. And 
this is highly crucial if we consider that Greece owns the most extensive coastline in 
EU, complex coastal configurations and especially in the Ionian Sea where the 
forthcoming oil exploitation will take place in close distance to the coasts of the 
western Greece and of numerous islands and islets. The coastal waters are already 
heavily impaired, by municipal wastes and maritime traffic and now the scheduled oil 
activities pose a new serious threat. The Protocol alone however, cannot bring any 
visible result for cleaner and better safeguarded coastal zones, as sets only the 
guideline for States actions and there isn’t any commitment for specific results115. 
Greece has to take further legal actions in order to ensure that the offshore 
exploration won’t cause dangerous degradation of the territorial seas, an effect that 
would jeopardise the country’s main economic activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 Article 9,(2),[f], ICZM Protocol. 
115 For further discussion see Gavouneli, M. (2008), Mediterranean Challenges: Between Old Problems 
and New Solutions, September 2008, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 23(3):477-
497. 
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4. The Greek national law provisions  
The proper examination of the legal regime is concluded in this chapter with the main 
domestic law provisions for sea environmental protection and liability in offshore 
operations. Afterword, an assessment is made for the critical failures of the Greek 
system that hinder the effective regulation of the respective activities and the 
protection of its seas. 
  
4.1 The system of applicable laws 
 
The protection of the environment in Greece as in most developed states worldwide is 
a pivotal issue. Based on a constitutional provision (Article 24 of Greek Constitution of 
2008) the living in a clean and ecological stable environment is a human right that 
anyone has to enjoy and a fundamental state’s obligation materialized through the 
implementation of specific precautionary and suppressive measures. In offshore 
operations, the pillars for environmental regulation116 are the national laws that 
transposed the European and International instruments, the environmental law 
L.1650/1986 that sets fundamental rules and mechanisms for the conservation of 
Greek seas and the Hydrocarbons law L.2289/1995 as amended by L.4001/2011. Also 
the regulation is supplemented by secondary legislation, (e.g. ministerial decisions 
etc.) and the contractual obligations of the licensee under the lease agreement which 
is mostly preferred by Greek state compared to the other type of concession contract, 
the production sharing contract. Is useful to note at this point that based on Greek 
Hydrocarbon law (Article 11 para.12) and although Greece hasn’t proclaimed its 
maritime zones, the units within the areas of EEZ and the continental shelf are 
considered Greek territory as per the application of domestic legislation and Greek 
Courts are granted jurisdiction. 
 
Starting from the initial stage of offshore governmental plans, a strategic 
environmental impact assessment is required, (according to JMA 107017/2006 which 
transposed the directive 2001/42/EC), where state has to evaluate the environmental 
                                                 
116 Panagos T. (2014), Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons: The regulatory framework in 
Greece,(in Greek), Sakkoulas, pp.145-161. 
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consequences from oil and gas operations, to investigate alternative choices and to 
conclude whether the plan should proceed and under which restrictions. Since this 
report is approved by the competent authority, the Ministry of Environment and 
Energy, it becomes binding during the whole time of operation proceedings. After that, 
follows the administrative procedure of environmental licensing governed by 
L.4014/2011, which involves the elaboration of an EIA by the selected applicant which, 
if approved, leads to a decision on approval of environmental terms issued by the 
Ministry of Environment and Energy. This act confers the compatibility of the project 
with the natural environment for certain period of time, with the provision of renewal 
or extension whilst the compliance of the operators to the terms is monitored by 
environmental authorities. By contrast, in less dangerous activities such as seismic 
surveys only a scheme of the precautionary measures (e.g. visual monitoring etc.) is 
required.  
 
The content of the documents of environmental licensing as well as the procedural 
rules, is governed by several Ministerial Decisions and a very detailed content of the 
submitted file on offshore drilling is required (Appendix 4.5 of MD 170225/2014) 
including technical procedures and measures that satisfy both the requirements of EU 
Law rules and interestingly Offshore Protocol rules. For reasons of publicity and 
transparency, the EIA document is uploaded in a special website (electronic 
environmental registry) where the entire licensing procedure can be monitored in 
tandem with EU obligations. Also, L. 4409/2016 article 4.6 highlights the particular 
attention that is paid for the licensing decision the technical and financial 
competencies of the applicant with regard to the protection of valuable marine 
ecosystems for the mitigation of climate change and specially protected sites. 
However, for marine Natura sites, there is a fragile compromise between 
environmental and financial targets. Article 10 of L.4014/2011 does not preclude the 
emplacement of offshore platforms in Natura sites even when the findings of EIA are 
against the delivery of the project, for reasons of high economic value or public 
interest and provided that specific compensatory measures are taken.  
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As per the protective measures taken during operations, applicable is the L.4409/2016 
incorporating the OSD requirements which are mentioned above and are summarized 
in an ongoing environmental management system and accident prevention policy and 
the hydrocarbon law L.2289/1995. According to Article 12a of the latter law (that was 
added by L.4001/2011) and until the publication of specific regulations for oil and gas 
operations by the Ministry of Environment and Energy after HHRM proposal, the 
licensee has to fully apply the national environmental legislation and the established 
oilfield practises and is inter alia obliged for: a) the sustainable use of natural resources 
within the licensed area, b) the prevention of release or discharge of hydrocarbons and 
other extracted elements during operation c) the use proper storage and the 
application of solid and hazardous wastes rules for hydrocarbon discharges, d) the 
creation of the least possible impacts for marine ecosystem and the compliance with 
licensor decisions for the adjustment of practices or the cease of operations in case of 
a serious safety breach. In paragraph 6 is noted that the 20% of the HHRM oil revenues 
are attributed to the special section of green national fund for the purposes of marine 
pollution action plans. Moreover, based on the article 12 for environmental protection 
of the current Model lease Agreement for exploration and exploitation117, the lessee, 
shall apply Good Oilfield Practices and national law requirements and to inform his 
workers and contractors over his obligations, since they will be also caught liable in 
case of damage118. On oil spill response, a contingency plan is set by Ministry of 
Shipping and the Hellenic Coast Guard as provided in the laws for the accession to 
OPRC and Barcelona Emergency Protocol.  
 
On the issue of liability, there is a strict responsibility for environmental damage for 
both the operator and the licensee governed by the Presidential Decree 148/2009 
(that transposed the environmental liability directive (2004/35/EC)) and by article 7 of 
L.4409/2016 respectively. However, this discrimination between license and operator 
has limited value based on the model lease agreement as the operator cannot be a 
                                                 
117 Model Lease Agreement for granting rights for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons at the 
offshore area of Greece (2017),available at: 
http://www.greekhydrocarbons.gr/images/docs/MODEL_LEASE_AGREEMENT.pdf (accessed 13 
February 2018). 
118 See above note 116 p.157. 
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legal entity different from the lessees. Marine pollution either from an oil spill or waste 
discharges is a criminal offense under Greek environmental law (Art. 28 L.1650/1986) 
where penalties of imprisonment and monetary penalties are imposed according to 
the gravity of the caused damage. There are also administrative fines that are imposed 
irrespectively of criminal sanctions. Liability for traditional damage is based on Article 
29 of L.1650/1986 which provides that “whoever, whether a physical person or legal 
entity, causes pollution or other degradation to the environment, is liable for 
compensation, unless he proves that the damage is due to a force majeure or was the 
result of a third party’s culpable act”119. Based on this broad wording a strict and 
uncapped liability is imposed on the polluter which covers bodily injury, property 
damage and the consequential economic losses. Even pure economic damage is 
covered by this provision, which stand for the loss of profits caused in the absence of 
property damage or bodily injury (e.g. the lost incomes from the cancelled recreations 
trips after a marine spill). Also all those types of damages are covered by Civil Code in 
case of an offshore accident but fewer claims are to be satisfied as it stipulates a fault 
based liability and claimant has to show the defendant negligence in causing the 
damage120.  
 
As per financial security products, the only legislative provision until recently was 
found in Greek Hydrocarbon Law (Article 12a) stating that the Minister for the 
Environment, Energy and Climate Change may require by licensee the submission of a 
guarantee or an all risk insurance but this obligation covers only the licensee 
compliance to the safety provisions and the coverage of environmental damage. It is 
only the latest L.4409/2016 that set the basis for alternative financial security 
instruments. In article 4.3 is specifically proclaimed a legislative act for the facilitation 
of the use of innovative forms of financial security besides traditionally accepted 
insurance that will allow oil companies to better hedge their risks and victims to be 
fully compensated. At the same article is also proclaimed a highly essential legislative 
                                                 
119The translation is attributed to the author of this paper. 
120Data for Greek civil liability and compensation provisions vis a vis to the legislation of 19 other 
member states to European economic area with offshore activity available at Commission Staff Working 
Document: Liability, Compensation and Financial Security for Offshore Accidents in the European 
Economic Area, SWD(2015) 167 final. 
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act for the acceleration of judiciary procedures for compensation claims as Greece 
shows extreme delays in justice delivery where victims cases can be last several years  
(or decades) before finally settled.   
 
Particular emphasis should be given to the current Model lease agreement as it hasn’t 
a sheer mention either to the issue of strict liability of the lessee in case of a sea spill or 
to the acceptance of alternative financial security products. It only provides that the 
lessee shall “indemnify, defend and hold the Lessor harmless against claims, losses and 
damages of any nature whatsoever, including, without limitation, claims for loss or 
damage to property, injury or death to persons or damage to the environment caused 
by or resulting from Petroleum Operations” (Art. 9.2 (i)) and “...to effect and maintain 
for Petroleum Operations insurance coverage of the type, and in such amount, as is 
customary in the international petroleum industry in accordance with Good Oilfield 
Practices...” (Art. 9.2 (g)).Contrarily, the text of 2012 Model agreement (article 12.2(b)) 
called “Lessee...to take all necessary and adequate steps...to ensure adequate 
compensation for injury to persons or damage to property by the effect of the 
Petroleum Operations”121.  
 
  
 
4.2. Current limitations of the Greek regulatory system 
 
There might have been considerable developments in the applicable regime, but its 
effectiveness, ultimately depends on the quality of its implementation, the monitoring 
and enforcement actions of the competent authorities. It’s true that in the Greek 
system there are serious imperfections. These are the extremely poor implementation 
of EU environmental law and the deficits in financial, human and technical resources. 
Greece is the second MS with the worst EU environmental law implementation with 24 
open cases of infringement and 5 non compliance cases to the decisions of EU Court of 
Justice (2016 data). This leads to high infringement penalties122, estimated in dozens 
                                                 
121 Ibid p.61. 
122 The cases are mainly about illegal landfills, urban waste and water treatment. 
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millions of euros, that burden the already constrained public budget. It’s very alarming 
to note that in case of Greece offshore drilling companies operate in a State with a 
combination of extreme financial weaknesses and a relaxation in natural assets 
protection.  
 
More specifically, in the area of environmental assessment of offshore projects there 
are major legal weaknesses. Greece until now hasn’t created a maritime spatial plan, 
even though more than a year has been passed from the transposition deadline of the 
respective Directive 2014/89/EC. Also, it hasn’t incorporated the revised EIA Directive 
2014/52/EU (whose transposition deadline has also expired since May 2017) that 
would simplify the overall licensing procedure and it hasn’t adopted a clear framework 
for the management and the extent of acceptability of offshore activities within Natura 
sites123.  All the above pose strong barriers in the effectiveness of SEA and EIA and the 
overall licensing procedure whilst they are against the IOC need for legal certainty.  
These should be also combined with the lack of marine environmental information, (as 
is noted in the recent strategic assessment for Ionian sea blocks124) as well as the 
deficits of Ministry of Environment and Energy, which is in charge of the review of the 
environmental assessments report, in human resources and independence from 
political and economic motives. With regard to the conservation of Greek seas, ten 
years after the adoption of Marine Strategy Directive, Greece hasn’t yet undertook any 
concrete measures toward the achievement of the GES of Greek waters125 and as 
already noted above, there is no legislation for ICZM. In the contrary, in the years of 
crisis, economic goals have been prioritized over environmental issues and policies 
regrettably are oriented in the stimulation of large carbon intensive investments like 
                                                 
123WWF, (October 2017), Law and environment in Greece, Summary of annual law review 2017, 
available at: http://www.wwf.gr/images/pdfs/WWF-NOMO-2017-%20Synopsis-EN.pdf  p.4 [last visited 
on 12 February 2018]. 
124 The lack of data refers inter alia to the environmental state of the sea bottom (the mapping of 
posidonia oceanic and possible coral reefs) and the scientific analysis of blocks seismicity. See above 
note  22 pp.36-39.  
125Commission Staff Working Document, ‘The EU Environmental Implementation Review, Country Report 
– GREECE, Accompanying the document. Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
The EU Environmental Implementation Review: Common Challenges and how to combine efforts to 
deliver better results’, SWD(2017) 41 final  p.13. 
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offshore drilling and not in making benefit from sustainable forms of development 
focusing in renewable energy sources given the country’s huge potential.  
 
The HHRM company, as already analysed above, cannot fulfil its role of the guarantor 
of OSD rules implementation and it’s also dubious that the competent environmental 
inspection bodies are able to monitor the compliance of oil industries to the 
environmental terms and to check the good state of the sea habitat during operations. 
It’s a demanding action performed with the use of adequate vessels, scientific 
personnel and research studies which requires high public costs but most importantly, 
a strong political commitment for seas protection which is absent until now in Greece. 
The history until now has shown that limited improvements have been made in 
environmental policy even after the EC intervention. Characteristic examples are the 
diachronic failures of Greek State to protect the Carretta carretta Community 
importance sites in Zakynthos island and Kyparissiakos Bay. Several violations have 
been noted by ECJ, including the illegal construction of buildings and even the 
operation of a landfill within the protected area. Additionally, the environmental 
authorities until now have shown low inspection action for the enforcement of law and 
only a small percentage of imposed environmental fines have being collected. So, all 
the above data show a disappointing contradiction. Greece has to be the guarantor of 
the compliance of oil companies with protective rules which the state itself has 
traditionally failed to implement. State has to reverse this situation promptly especially 
if we take into consideration the disparity of power that exists between the financially 
weak Greek state and the powerful oil companies. 
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OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation has been to detect and assess the key instruments for 
the protection of Greek marine environment from offshore oil and gas units. The 
findings have shown that in the area of safety, pollution prevention and response 
there have been important legal developments. The two regulatory pillars for offshore 
installations in Greece are found in the offshore safety directive and the offshore 
Barcelona Protocol while the protection of marine environment is supported mainly by 
the European legislation. 
 
A global convention to ideally govern all aspects of offshore drilling does not exist and 
there is no projection to be created in the foreseeable future. However, the future 
regulatory reforms should focus on the main problem, which is the absence of a clear 
framework for liability and compensation in case of a trans-boundary oil spill accident. 
It should be tackled either in a global level with the revival of the CLEE, which seems a 
difficult task at the moment or with the adoption of a Mediterranean regulation. In 
order to achieve that, the offshore Protocol has to gain more power with its full 
ratification by the Barcelona members including the EU states. Contracting members 
should renew their discussions for the establishment a Mediterranean compensation 
Fund extending them to the adoption of a regional rule for the strict liability of 
operators. Moreover, the option of a private initiative by companies active in the 
Mediterranean should be explored, for the creation of a compensation agreement in 
the model of OPOL, which will ensure adequate compensation, a stronger 
commitment to safety and creation of common objectives, as companies will become 
bound to one another.  
 
In a national level, the only way for Greece to develop its upstream offshore activity 
without environmental compromises, is to undertake serious legal and policy actions 
for the protection of its marine environment. Since domestic offshore oil and gas plans 
are now at a tipping point, the state must correct the failures and commit on a 
complete adoption and enforcement of environmental rules. In order to do that, the 
competent authorities that monitor the oil and gas operations, shall be independent 
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and truly functional, with sufficient financial, administrative and technical capacities. 
Finally, oil and gas activities should be subject to a national strategy for the 
conservation of marine protected areas and the sustainable use of marine 
environment taking into account the economic revenues that clean seas create. All the 
above are challenging tasks for Greece, because under serious economic hurdles has to 
change established bad practices and to increase its public expenses dedicated to 
environment. For this reason is extremely important the role of environmental non-
governmental organisations to put pressure for state’s actions, to monitor the effects 
in sea habitat from the offshore infrastructures and to raise public awareness over the 
issue. 
 
To conclude, the renewed Greek interest on hydrocarbons should not to be seen as a 
chance to recover from the ongoing financial crisis. The inherent regulatory 
weaknesses and the fragility of marine environment indicate that the benefits that will 
arise in public revenues, employment and national growth are negligible compared to 
the magnitude of the dangers and their consequences. It’s true that no amount of 
money will be enough to repair the damage of an oil spill in Greek sensitive marine 
areas. Following the global clean energy mandates, Greek government has to 
reconsider its offshore oil and gas strategy, looking at green economy options that 
respect the natural habitat and take advantage of the huge domestic potentials. With 
still fresh the wounds from the tanker oil spill incident in Greek waters in September 
2017, it’s a national mandate to achieve a true change in Greece’s environmental 
policy and mentality. 
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ANNEX I 
Map of oil and gas contracts in the Mediterranean Sea (2015) 
 
 
 
Source: WWF-France Report, Blue growth in the Mediterranean Sea: The challenge of 
good environmental status, 2015, 
http://medtrends.org/reports/MEDTRENDS_REGIONAL.pdf 
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ANNEX II 
The 20 blocks of the second licensing round (2014) 
 
 
Source: Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy (YPEKA), 2nd International licensing 
round, http://www.ypeka.gr/Default.aspx?tabid=875  
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